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Abstract
We show that Miller and Pazgals (2001) model of strategic dele-
gation, in which managerial incentives are based upon relative perfor-
mance, is a¤ected by a non-existence problem which has impact on the
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1 Introduction
By now, the issue of strategic delegation in oligopoly has received a large
amount of attention, with several di¤erent types of contract having been
taken into account. The main alternatives investigated in the literature ex-
amine managerial incentive schemes based on a weighted average of
 prots and output (Vickers, 1985);
 prots and revenues (Fershtman and Judd, 1985; Sklivas, 1987);
 Comparative performance evaluation (Miller and Pazgal, 2001);
 prots and market share (Jansen et al., 2007; Ritz, 2008).
Here we revisit the contribution by Miller and Pazgal (2001, henceforth
MP), who adopt a model of strategic delegation where managerial incentives
rely upon relative performance. In this case, the delegation contract estab-
lishes that a managers objective consists in maximising a weighted average
of his own rms prots and the rivals prots w.r.t. the relevant market
variable, either quantity or price.1
They claim that in such a setup, and unlike the previous approaches
to strategic delegation (cf. Vickers, 1985; and Fershtman and Judd, 1987,
inter alia) an equivalence result holds. That is, if the managerial objective
is constructed on a relative prot performance scheme, the choice between
price and quantity becomes immaterial as the equilibrium outcome is the
same regardless of the way competition takes place at the market stage.
1The adoption of such objective function in a setup describing the interplay between
managerial rms can be thought of as a specic instance of a general class of problems in
which the relative standing of peersoutcomes inuences each agents individual preference
structure (see Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini, 2011).
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We re-examine MPs analysis to single out a mistake in the derivation
of the (alleged) subgame perfect equilibrium in the model where the mar-
ket stage is played in the price space. In particular, MP have overlooked a
problem with price competition with perfect substitutes that requires taking
limits instead of solving FOCs. When taking this into account, there ap-
pears that price competition with comparative performance evaluation con-
tracts amounts to building up an explicit cartel that (i) should be prosecuted
according to antitrust laws; (ii) is unstable, as it is subject to unilateral de-
viations, and therefore (iii) is not an equilibrium outcome of the two-stage
delegation game.
Our analysis is also motivated by an earlier paper on relative prot incen-
tives; see Lundgren (1996). The author argues that motivating managers to
maximize relative prots rather than absolute prots will prevent collusion
among the managers of di¤erent rms. He states that "The key to under-
standing this method rests upon ... the observation that successful collusion
increases absolute prots of rms, but does not increase the relative prof-
its of rms." (p. 534). Accordingly, rms with relative prot motives have
incentive to cheat or undercut the rivals price.2
The cornerstone of our argument is the presence of an undercutting in-
centive that destroys the alleged candidate equilibrium for any degree of
substitutability between goods. If substitutability is su¢ ciently high, price
undercutting makes the deviating rm a monopolist, very much like what
happens in the Hotelling (1929) spatial competition model with linear disu-
tility of transportation, where each rm has an incentive to undercut the
rivals price for su¢ ciently high degrees of substitutability between products,
thereby undermining the existence of a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies due to insu¢ cient product di¤erentiation (cf. dAspremont et al.,
2For this method Lundgren was even granted a patent (Patent No. US 7,065,495 B1)
on June 20, 2006.
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1979). The presence of the undercutting incentive under price competition
and relative performance compensation can be also explained with reference
to another stream of literature that, at rst sight, might seem unrelated to
the issue of strategic delegation, which is the branch of the IO literature dis-
cussing the stability of implicit collusion with di¤erentiated products. The
reason is that the adoption of delegation incentives based on relative prot
performance mimics to some extent the behaviour of a cartel, as in both
cases each rm internalises the e¤ect of its own behaviour on the other rms
prots. From several contributions (cf. Deneckere, 1983; Ross, 1992; and
Lambertini, 1997, inter alia), we know that if products are su¢ ciently simi-
lar, the unilateral deviation from implicit collusion in prices makes the cheat-
ing rm a monopolist. The intuition behind the non-existence of the price
equilibrium ultimately boils down to the idea that comparative performance
evaluation boosts the aggressiveness of managers and lures the owners into
exploiting such aggressiveness to steal the rivals customers (eventually all of
them if product di¤erentiation is not large enough), in a destructive way.
Another way of looking at the same setup is to think of the same objective
function as that of the owners, not the managers, in the case where the owner
of rm i buys a share of rm j (and conversely), in such a way that each
owner is entitled to enjoy part of the prots generated by the other rm.3
With this in mind, it is immediate to conclude that the choice between price
and quantity becomes immaterial, as the two rms behave as a monopolist or
a cartel, obviously indi¤erent between price- and quantity-setting. However,
again the cartel is subject to unilateral deviations. Therefore, none of the
alleged equilibria outlined by MP is indeed an equilibrium, as the delegation
3A long-standing discussion on this point exists in the literature. See, e.g., Bishop
(1960), Friedman (1968), Cyert and DeGroot (1973), Bresnahan and Salop (1986),
Reynolds and Snapp (1986), Clayton and Jorgensen (2005) and Kopel and Szidarovszky
(2006).
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contract designed by Miller and Pazgal (2001) is not robust to unilateral
renegotiation between owner and manager of the same rm (equivalently, in
the jargon of dynamic games, any contract shaped as in MP is doomed to
be time inconsistent). Moreover, this class of contracts could then appear
as a way of getting around regulatory measures designed to limit horizon-
tal mergers, by setting up cartels hidden behind the screen of a seemingly
non cooperative behaviour on the part of managers in the market phase.
And yet, when considered for what they really are - an instrument to build
up some degree of collusion - these delegation contracts should in fact re-
ceive the closest possible attention by antitrust agencies and be prosecuted.
Additionally, in an application of their model to intraindustry trade, Miller
and Pazgal (2005) claim that optimal trade policy becomes insensitive to
the mode of market competition if rms adopt delegation contracts based
on relative performance. On the basis of our analysis, this cannot hold in
equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines
MPs analysis and conclusions. The proof of the non-existence of equilibrium
is then carried out in section 3. Concluding remarks are in section 4.
2 Preliminaries: Miller-Pazgals linear model
The main focus of Miller and Pazgals (2001) analysis is on a model of di¤er-
entiated duopoly due to Bowley (1924) and then revived by Spence (1976),
Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives (1984).
The utility function of the representative consumer, characterised by a
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preference for variety, is (cf. Singh and Vives, 1984, p. 547):4
U = q1 + q2   1
2


 
q2
2 + q2
2

+ 2q1q2

(1)
where parameter  2 [ ; ] measures the degree of substitutability (in the
positive range) or complementarity (in the negative range) between goods.
If instead  = 0; the two rms are independent monopolists on completely
separated markets.
Inverse and direct market demand functions can be specied as follows:
pi =   qi   qj (2)
qi =

 + 
  pi
   2 +
pj
   2 (3)
depending on whether Cournot or Bertrand competition is considered, and
the prot function of rm i is i = (pi   c) qi:
The game has a standard two-stage structure, with owners playing si-
multaneously at the rst stage in the space of delegation incentives (i; j) ;
and managers playing simultaneously either in quantities or in prices. The
manager of rm i maximises
mi = i + ij (4)
w.r.t. either qi or pi; and receives a remuneration !i = Ai +Bimi  0:5
4Indeed, we are using a simplied version of Miller and Pazgals (2001) original setup,
as they assume inverse demand functions:
pi = i   iqi   iqj
admitting a set of asymmetric parameters. However, while assuming di¤erent is and
is is indeed admissible, the same does not apply for ; as the latter parameter measures
the taste for variety in the representative consumers mind, as from (1). For more on these
aspects of the model, see Singh and Vives (1984, pp. 547-48).
5Note that Ai and Bi need not be simultaneously positive, as long as the managers
participation constraint is satised. For instance, Ai could be negative, as it would happen
in the case of a franchise fee.
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2.1 The MP game
Here a brief summary of the MP game. Both rmsmanagers are choosing
simultaneously the output or price levels. consider rst the Cournot case.
Proceeding by backward induction, one has to solve the Cournot-Nash game
between managers and then fold the game back towards the rst stage to
characterise optimal incentives. For the sake of brevity, we skip the com-
putational details and list the expressions of the equilibrium variables and
objective functions (superscript C standing for Cournot):
C =   
2 + 
; qC =
(  c) (2 + )
4 ( + )
pC =
 (2   ) + c (2 + )
4
C =
(  c)2  42   2
162 ( + )
mC =
(  c)2 (2   )
8 ( + )
(5)
The Bertrand equilibrium (according to MP) looks exactly the same in
terms of optimal output, price and prots i.e., qB = qC ; pB = pC ; B = C ;
except that
B =

2    and m
B =
(  c)2 (2 + )
8 ( + )
(6)
with mB > mC8 2 (0; ] and conversely in the negative range. In the
remainder, for simplicity and without further loss of generality, we focus on
the case where  = 1:
At this point, three observations can be put forward:
1) Observe that, for all  2 [0; 1] ;
@C
@
=   2
(2 + )2
< 0 ;
@B
@
=
2
(2  )2 > 0 (7)
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with
C 2

 1
3
; 0

; B 2 [0; 1] (8)
so that, while C indeed allows for an interpretation of the setup in
terms of comparative performance, the functional form of B indeed
drives in the opposite direction, as delegation under Bertrand compe-
tition takes the form of an increasing degree of collusion as products
become less di¤erentiated.
2) Now, taking for granted that C and B are correct, one should see
monopoly pricing under Bertrand competition, in correspondence of
 = 1 given that B = 1 with homogeneous goods, entailing that rms
are fully colluding. However, from (5) we have
pB

=1
= pC

=1
=
+ 3c
4
(9)
which is lower than monopoly price pM = (+ c) =2 for all  > c.
3) Conversely, under Bertrand behaviour one would expect to observe mar-
ginal cost pricing in correspondence of  = 1 since rms set prices - at
least in principle, in a fully non cooperative way - with homogeneous
products. While in VFJS price competition with perfect substitutes
collapses onto marginal cost pricing, here, seemingly, it doesnt.
3 First order conditions and limit properties
To understand the mechanics of the model, one has to delve into the details of
the managersbehaviour in the price stage. The relevant rst order condition
at the market stage of the Bertrand game is:
@mi
@pi
=
(1  )  (2pi   c) +  [i (pj   c) + pj]
1  2 = 0 (10)
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yielding
pi =
 (1  ) [2 +  (1 + i)]  c [j (1 + i) 2   ( (1  i) + 2)]
4  (1 + i) (1 + j) 2 : (11)
Plugging the price pair (11) into rm is prot function, the latter be-
comes:
i =
(  c)2 (1  ) [2 +  (1 + i)] [2 +  (1  i)  i (1 + j) 2]
(1 + ) [4  (1 + i) (1 + j) 2]2
(12)
while output is
qi =
(  c) (1  ) [2   (i (1 + j)  + i   1)]
(1 + ) [4  (1 + i) (1 + j) 2] (13)
According to MP, i must be maximised w.r.t. i; yielding i = j = 
B =
= (2  ) : The resulting quantity, price, prots and managerial objective
function should be as in (5).
This is where we start illustrating our objections to MPs claims. Our
observations can be succinctly listed as follows:
Remark 1: Take j = i =  (not necessarily MPs B; but any symmetric
). From (12), note that i = 0 for  = 1. Therefore, one should
expect marginal cost pricing to arise if rms supply perfect substitutes.
However, assuming i = j yields
i =
(  c)2(1  )(1  )
(1 + ) [2     ]2 ; (14)
which takes the indeterminate 0=0 form taking into account that B !
1 as  ! 1. Applying the rule of de lHospital twice shows that the
prot expression converges towards monopoly prot M = (a  c)2=8.
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Remark 2: Again, set j = i = , to simplify (11) as follows:
piji=j= =
(1  ) + c(1  )
2   (1 + ) : (15)
Now note that assuming  xed implies that p = c if  = 1. On the
other hand, taking into account that B ! 1 as  ! 1, then expression
(15) becomes indeterminate (taking a 0=0 form). Applying de lHospital
rule yields
lim
!1
piji=j= =
+ c
1 + 
(16)
and hence convergence towards the monopoly price pM = (+ c) =2 at
 = 1.
Remark 3: Alternatively, for any pair of i and j, we have
lim
!1
pi = c: (17)
This reveals the problematic nature of Bertrand behaviour in the MP
setup with homogeneous goods: in the neighbourhood of  = 1; the
limit behaviour of the Bertrand setup is sensitive to the order according
to which one evaluates the limits of the endogenous variables. The ul-
timate implication seems to be that symmetric incentive schemes point
towards monopoly pricing, but the latter is unstable and ultimately col-
lapses to the Bertrand paradox. This raises the issue of undercutting
incentives, to which we will come back extensively in the remainder.
Remark 4: Examine the FOC on (12) as in MP:
@i
@i
=
(  c)2 (1  ) [2 +  (1 + j)] 2
(1 + ) [4  (1 + i) (1 + j) 2]3
	 = 0 (18)
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with
	  (1 + j) (2 + )    i [4 +  (1 + j) (2  )] (19)
Now set j = i and rewrite the FOC as follows
@i
@i
=
(  c)2 (1  ) 2 [    (2  )]
(1 + ) [2   (1 + )]3 [2 +  (1 + )] = 0 (20)
and observe that the MP candidate solution, B = = (2  ) comes
from     (2  ) = 0. However, with  = B, the expression on the
r.h.s. of the above FOC is indeterminate in correspondence of  = 1;
since also the denominator is nil. The same applies to quantities, prices
and prots because of the presence of the expression
4  (1 + i) (1 + j) 2 (21)
at the denominator, in all of them.
Accordingly, one has to impose j = i and then resort to the limit for
 ! 1 in order to obtain the monopoly price, which, in turn, is obviously
subject to undercutting. Therefore, we may state:
Proposition 1 With perfect substitutes, Bertrand competition cannot sus-
tain equilibrium prices above marginal cost. As a result, the outcomes yielded
by delegation contracts based on comparative performance evaluation are not
observationally equivalent irrespective of the market variables being set by
managers.
Without further discussion, it is worth noting that the same trivially
holds in the mixed case in which a single rm is a price-setter while the other
is a quantity setter, where marginal cost pricing emerges in correspondence
of full substitutability with pure prot-seeking (entrepreneurial) rms (see
Singh and Vives, 1984).
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3.1 Product di¤erentiation and undercutting incentives
The next question is whether the same conclusion applies also when there
exists some degree of di¤erentiation. In this respect, our analysis replicates
quite closely that of (i) dAspremont et al. (1979) concerning the original
version of the Hotelling game, as well as (ii) Deneckere (1983), Ross (1992)
and many others, concerning deviations from cartel prices in supergames
based on the Singh and Vives (1984) framework.
The question we are about to address can be formulated in two alternative
ways:
(i) for  2 (0; 1] ; and given
pj = p
B () ; i = j = ; (22)
so that (11) rewrites as
pB () =
(1  )  c (   1)
2   (1 + ) ; (23)
is there an undercutting price pui () that the manager of rm i can
choose, so as to yield !ui = Ai+Bim
u > !B = Ai+Bim
B and ui () >
B ()? Alternatively,
(ii) for  2 (0; 1] ; can the owner of rm i design an undercutting contract
ui such that, given
pi = pi
 
i; 
B

; pj = p
B; j = 
B =

2   (24)
the manager of rm i sets pi (
u
i ) reproducing the same price as if the
manager himself where deviating at the second stage to maximise i?
Route (i) Trivially, as we already know from the foregoing discussion, the
answer to version (i) turns out to be positive if  = 1; where unilateral
deviation involves the cheating rm setting the undercutting price
pui =
+ c
2
  " (25)
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to obtain full monopoly prots M , as the cheated rms sales are driven to
zero. If so, then mi = M and !ui = Ai +Bi
M > !B; while6
ui = 
M   !ui = (1 Bi)M   Ai > (1  2Bi)
M
2
  Ai (26)
reduces to
1 Bi > 1  2Bi
2
(27)
which is satised by any admissible value of Bi:
If instead  2 (0; 1), we have what follows. Suppose rm i undercuts rm
j; choosing pDi to solve
qj =

1 + 
  p
B ()
1  2 +
pui
1  2 = 0) (28)
pui () =
(1  ) [1   (1 + )] + c (   1)
 [ (1 + )  2]
whereby the undercutting prots are
ui () =
(  c)2 (1  ) (1  ) [ (1 + )  1]
2 [ (1 + )  2]2 : (29)
Being  and  conned to the unit interval, the above expression is positive
for all
 > e  1  

< 1 8 2

1
2
; 1

(30)
with e < B for all  2 (2=3; 1] : It can be easily checked that
sign

ui ()  B ()
	
= sign f (1 + )    1g (31)
and consequently
ui () > 
B () 8  > b  1
 (1 + )
(32)
6The coe¢ cient (1  2Bi) appearing on the r.h.s. of inequality (26) is the limit ofh
1 Bi

1 + B
i
as  tends to one.
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with b < 1 for all  2   p5  1 =2; 1 ; b < B for all  2 (0:81; 1] ; andb > e always.
Hence, we may claim:
Lemma 2 Suppose i = j = : Undercutting the rivals price so as to drive
its market share down to zero is protable for all
 2

1
 (1 + )
; 1

;  2 (0:81; 1] :
In this parameter region,

B; pB
	
does not identify a subgame perfect equi-
librium in pure strategies.
The above discussion applies for all values of  and  such that deviations
give rise to monopoly. Suppose instead this is not the case, so that the
cheated rm is not driven out of business. This happens whenever the price
resulting from
@ui ()
@pi
= 0) pui () =
 (1  ) (   2) + c [ (1 + )    2]
2 [ (1 + )  2] (33)
is such that the cheated rms output is positive, i.e.,
qj (p
u
i ()) =
(  c) [2   (2 + ) ]
2 (1 + ) [2   (1 + )] > 0 (34)
which, again considering that  and  are conned in the unit interval, holds
for all  <   2= [ (2 + )] ; with
 < 1 8 2  p3  1; 1
  B 8 2 (0; 0:881; 1] (35)
and conversely outside this region. The resulting deviation prots are:
ui () =
(  c)2 (1  )(2  )2
4 (1 + ) [2   (1 + )]2 (36)
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with
ui ()  B () =
(  c)4 (1  )2 (2  )2(1  )
4 (1 + )2 [2   (1 + )]4 (37)
which is always positive in the admissible parameter range. Accordingly, we
have:
Lemma 3 Suppose i = j =  and consider the case where undercutting
the rivals price does not grant monopoly power to the deviator. In such a
range, price undercutting is always protable.
Given that there exists a managerial remuneration scheme in correspon-
dence of which a unilateral price deviation is desirable from the owners and
the managers standpoint alike, in correspondence of a continuum of values
of . Consequently, Lemmata 2-3 imply:
Proposition 4 Due to the presence of an undercutting incentive at the price
stage, the subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies fails to exists for
symmetric delegation contracts i = j = :
Route (ii) Firm j is playing

B = = (2  ) ; pB = [ (2  ) + c (2 + )] =4	 :
Given these strategies, we investigate whether, for a generic i there exists
any price interval for pi such that i > B = C : The expression for i is:
i =
(pi   c) [ (4   (2 + )) + c (2 + )    4pi]
4 (1  2) (38)
whereby i > B for all
pi 2

 [2   (1 + )] + c [2 +  (1 + )]
4
;
 (2  ) + c (2 + )
4

; (39)
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the upper bound of such interval coinciding with pB. The second step consists
in taking the rst order condition @i=@pi = 0 on (38), which is satised by
pui =
 [4   (2 + )] + c [4 +  (2 + )]
8
(40)
It is then easy to verify that pui is the midpoint of the interval appearing
in (39). The corresponding undercutting prots amount to:
ui =
(  c)2 [4   (2 + )]2
64 (1  2) > 
B 8  2 ( 1; 1); (41)
which immediately implies that undercutting is always protable, even in the
complementarity range.
Yet, with

j = 
B; pi = p
u
i ; pj = p
B
	
and a generic level of i, the rms
outputs are:
qi =
(  c) [4   (2 + )]
8 (1  2)
qj =
(  c) [4   (2 + (2 + )]
8 (1  2)
(42)
with qi > 0 for all 0s, while qj > 0 for all  < b = 0:881: Hence, for all
 2 (b; 1], one has to solve qj = 0 to nd the relevant deviation price:
pui (qj = 0) =
 (3   2) + c (2 + )
4
> c 8  > 2
3
; (43)
and again belonging to the interval (39). The corresponding undercutting
prots are:
ui (qj = 0) = (p
u
i   c) (  pui ) =
(  c)2 (2 + ) (3   2)
162
: (44)
Obviously, (40) and (43) coincide at  = b: The foregoing discussion proves:
Lemma 5 Given

j = 
B; pi = p
u
i ; pj = p
B
	
; and for any i, the price that
maximises rm is prots is
pui =
8><>:
 [4   (2 + )] + c [4 +  (2 + )]
8
8  < b
 (3   2) + c (2 + )
4
8  2 (b; 1]
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with pui < p
B over the entire parameter range.
This second approach can also be interpreted in a di¤erent way. That is,
we may ask ourselves whether the owner and manager of the deviating rm
may indeed collude to design the optimal deviation against the rival, that is
setting the candidate equilibrium contract and price. This requires nding
out whether there exists a value of the delegation variable, call it ui ; such
that, given (i) the pricing rule of rm is managers pi = pi as in (11), (ii)
pj = p
B; and (iii) j = 
B = = (2  ) ; the owner of rm i can induce his
manager to set pi = pi (
u
i ) = p
u
i as in (40), reproducing the same situation
that would be observed if the manager himself where deviating at the second
stage to attain prots ui : We can identify the critical level 
u
i by using the
managers price selection given in (11) and solving:
pi(
u
i ; 
B) =
 (1  ) [2 +  (1 + ui )]  c


 
j (1 + 
u
i ) + 
u
i   1
  2
4  (1 + ui )
 
1 + j

2
=
 [4   (2 + )] + c [4 +  (2 + )]
8
(45)
to obtain
ui =
3
8   [8   (2  )] > 0 (46)
which holds for all 0 <  < b = 0:881:Within such a range of substitutability,
by using ui the owner of rm i can attain the undercutting prots even if his
manager is using the pricing rule that solves the relevant rst order condition
at the second stage of the game.
To perform the same exercise in the remainder of the substitutability
range, where  2 (b; 1] ; one has to proceed as in collusion models (see
Deneckere, 1983, and Lambertini, 1997, inter alia). The quantity of rm j,
given pi = pi; pj = p
B; and j = 
B; becomes nil at
ui (qj = 0) =
8 (1  ) + 2 (22 +    4)
2 [ (3  2)  2] (47)
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whereby rm is manager sets pi (
u
i (qj = 0)) = [ (3   2) + c (2 + )] = (4)
satisfying the rst order condition and yet coinciding with (43).
The above analysis entails the following:
Lemma 6 Take pi = pi; pj = pB; and j = 
B: For all levels of product
substitutability, the owner of rm i will nd it convenient to manoeuvre the
incentive scheme of his own manager so as to induce the manager to mimic
a price undercutting. The related managerial incentives are:
ui =
3
8   [8   (2  )] 8  2 (0; b)
ui =
8 (1  ) + 2 (22 +    4)
2 [ (3  2)  2] 8  2 (b; 1] :
For  2 (b; 1] ; rm i becomes a monopolist.
Lemmata 5-6 imply our last result:
Proposition 7 For all  2 (0; 1] ; the subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-
stage game where managerial incentives are based upon comparative prot
performance fails to exist in pure strategies.
To complete the picture we now briey comment upon managerial remu-
neration in the undercutting case. The associated level of mi is
mui =
(  c)2 f128 +  [ (128 +  (32   (4  ) (8 +  (2 + ))))  256]g
64 (1  2) [8   (8   (2  ))]
(48)
for all  2 (0; b) ; and
mui (qj = 0) =
(  c)2 (2 + ) (3   2)
162
= ui (qj = 0) (49)
for all  2 (b; 1] ; as in this range rm js prots are nil. It is easily checked
that (48) and (49) are both lower than mB: However, the manager of the
18
deviating rm can be made at least as well o¤ by manoeuvring the constants
Ai and Bi appropriately.7
4 Concluding remarks
We have revisited Miller and Pazgals (2001) model of strategic delegation
with managerial contracts based upon relative performance, to single out a
non-existence problem a¤ecting the model whenever the weight attached to
the rival rms prots in the delegation contract is positive, for any degree of
product di¤erentiation. This problem is due to the fact that under Bertrand
behaviour the delegation contract attaches a positive weight to the rivals
prots, whereby rms closely replicate the performance of a cartel in prices,
being thus subject to unilateral deviations.
We have focussed on Bertrand competition, where this issue strikingly
arises, but analogous considerations apply to the mixed case where at least
one rm is a price-setting agent.
7As anticipated above, an undercutting incentive also exists if one rm sets price,
whereas the other rm sets quantity. We omit the analysis of this case for brevity.
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